Battle of Warsaw (1920)

gigatos | April 2, 2022

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Summary

The Battle of Warsaw, commonly known as the Miracle at the Vistula River – a military operation fought August 13-25, 1920 between the Soviet Red Army troops and the armies of the Polish Army, grouped on the Vistula River, the decisive battle of the Polish-Bolshevik war.

Finding themselves in a critical situation, at the threshold of a defeat expected by many, the Polish Army units managed to push back and defeat the advancing Soviet troops of the Western Front of Mikhail Tukhachevsky. The victory of the Polish side in the battle radically changed the fate of the war, allowed to preserve the independence of the resurgent Republic of Poland, and cancelled the Soviet plans for an offensive on Western Europe and the plans for an international revolution.

The key role was played by the Polish Army”s outflanking maneuver against the Red Army, developed with the participation of Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army Tadeusz Rozwadowski and executed by Commander-in-Chief Jozef Pilsudski, which was led out from the Wieprz River on August 16, 1920, while tying down the main Bolshevik forces on the outskirts of Warsaw.

It was a breakthrough moment for the Polish side, which since the end of the offensive on Kiev, was forced by the Soviet forces into a chaotic retreat westward. At the turn of July and August 1920, the situation of the Polish army was becoming critical. An attempt to stop the offensive of the Bolshevik forces on the Bug River line ended in failure. At the beginning of August, the fortress of Brest was surrendered, and the Red Army gained an open road to Warsaw. The Polish forces seemed close to collapse, and observers predicted a decisive Soviet victory. On August 6 the Polish troops received orders to retreat to the Vistula in order to regroup their forces, prepare a counteroffensive and organize the defense of the capital. General Jozef Haller formed Volunteer Army, and General Franciszek Latinik became Military Governor of Warsaw.

The battle began on August 13, 1920, when the Red Army troops, commanded by Mikhail Tuchaczewski, approached Warsaw. The fighting took place in an area reaching south to Wlodawa on the Bug River, and north to Dzialdowo. The defensive phase of the battles was concentrated on General Jozef Haller”s Northern Front. General Franciszek Latinik”s 1st Army, although initially forced to retreat in the area of Radzymin to the second line of defense between Nieporęt and Rembertów, finally successfully stopped the Soviet attack on the Warsaw outskirts, while on August 14th the Polish 5th Army of General Władysław Sikorski undertook offensive actions on the river Wkra.

The decisive blow to the Soviet armies was inflicted by the Assault Group of Commander-in-Chief Jozef Pilsudski, which led a counteroffensive from the Wieprz River on August 16, breaking through the front near Kock and Cycow, and then reaching the rear of the Soviet armies, which were attacking Warsaw. The actions of the Polish forces forced the Red Army to retreat eastward in an unorganized manner. The Red Army suffered significant losses. Since that moment for next weeks Polish Army was in permanent offensive. Polish forces moved to the pursuit, gaining successive victories.

According to British politician and diplomat Edgar D”Abernon, the Battle of Warsaw was one of the eighteen landmark battles in world history. Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin called it a “tremendous defeat” for his forces.

In Polish historiography the most established name of the battle is the Battle of Warsaw or, according to the rules of spelling, the Battle of Warsaw.

There is also a popular expression of the Miracle on the Vistula. It was coined by Stanisław Stroński, who on 14 August 1920 recalled a similar dramatic situation in France during World War I in September 1914, when the unexpected rejection of the German army from the outskirts of Paris was called the Miracle on the Marne. The term was first used in public debate by Wincenty Witos, and was eagerly raised by Piłsudski”s political opponents, who questioned the Marshal”s contribution to the preparation and execution of that operation. At the same time, the phrase acquired a religious connotation, since the Church (also hostile to Piłsudski) very quickly seized upon the description of the battle as a miracle, and decided to combine its decisive day of August 16th with the day of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Queen of the Polish Crown, celebrated the day before.

Both the name Battle of Warsaw and the name Miracle on the Vistula are opposed to Professor Lech Wyszczelski, who proposes the name of the battle on the outskirts of Warsaw. As he stresses, it was not Warsaw that was the main target of the Soviet armies, no missile fell on it and the warfare was conducted over 450 km.

Red Army

The Commander-in-Chief of the entire Red Army was Sergei Kamenev, reporting directly to the Commissar of War and Navy (Narcomoyenmor) Lv Trotsky who was also (like Stalin) a member of the then five-member Politburo (Politburo) consisting of: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev as full members, Pyatakov and Bukharin as deputy members.

The Red Army attacked with forces grouped into two operational compounds:

Mikhail Tukhachevsky”s Western Front participating in the Battle of Warsaw with political commissar Ivar Smilga:

Alexander Yegorov”s South-Western Front with political commissar Joseph Stalin, which did not take part in the Battle of Warsaw:

The armies of both fronts were initially separated by a huge complex of Polesie swamps and interacted with each other very loosely. As they advanced, the operational gap in the center of the grouping, filled only with weak formations, widened even more.

This took place in defiance of the instructions of the Supreme Command of the Red Army of August 3 and 11, ordering the redeployment of considerable forces of the South-Western Front (Budionny”s Horse Army and Voskhanov”s 12th Army) from Malopolska and Volhynia to Warsaw.

The right wing of Tukhachevsky”s army (4th Army Sergeyev (Shuvaev) and Gaia Corps) received the task of capturing the area of Grudziądz and Toruń and forcing the Vistula River from Dobrzyń to Wloclawek. The order to ford the Vistula River (between Plock and Wyszogrod) was also given to the 15th Kork Army.

The center of Tukhachevsky”s forces was directed at Modlin (Lazarievich”s 3rd Army) and at Warsaw (Sollohub”s 16th Army).

Covering the left wing of the 16th Army was entrusted to Timothy Khviesin”s Mozyr group, approaching from Wlodawa on the Vistula north of Deblin.

The main forces of the Southwest Front, on the other hand, were on the Strypa River (Molkochanov”s 14th Army) and near Brody (Budionny”s Horse Army) and were pushing toward Lvov, while Voskanov”s 12th Army was forcing the Bug River south of Wlodawa.

The majority of the Western Front”s forces were thus advancing in a north-western direction, north of Warsaw, while the bulk of the South-Western Front”s forces were advancing in a south-western direction, towards Lvov.

In total, about 104-114 thousand soldiers, 600 cannons and over 2450 machine guns participated in the Battle of Warsaw alone.

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Polish Army

The first step in strengthening the country”s defensive power was the establishment of the State Defense Council on July 3, 1920. “The decision in matters where the existence and life of nations are at stake must be as quick and electrifying as the decision of those who carry death, the defenders of the country.” On the appeal of the Council numerous crowds of volunteers began to arrive, bringing, in addition to “numerical strength”, the moral strength resulting from the duty to defend the Fatherland. The number of volunteers amounted to about 80 thousand soldiers. Initially, the intention was to form a volunteer army, but Pilsudski decided to create battalions and only one volunteer division. Polish women also responded to the appeal, forming the Women”s Legion, which operated mainly in auxiliary services. A cavalry operational group was also created, and remnants of the 5th Siberian Division arrived from Siberia. In July, the vintages of 1890 to 1894 were called into service, and at the crucial moments of August 1920, despite enormous losses, the army”s numbers exceeded 900,000 soldiers.

The Supreme Command of the Polish Army countered the Soviet armies with forces grouped in six armies and formations guarding the Vistula River from Torun to Wyszogrod (the 20th Infantry Division – formerly the 2nd Lithuanian-Byelorussian Division) as well as reserve and volunteer battalions.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces was Jozef Pilsudski and the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army was Tadeusz Rozwadowski. The Polish forces were divided by them into three fronts:

General Joseph Haller”s Northern Front:

The Central Front of General Edward Smigly-Rydz:

General Waclaw Iwaszkiewicz”s Southern Front (he garrisoned the section from Brody to the Romanian border, he did not take part in the Battle of Warsaw):

The Polish side had at its disposal 29 infantry divisions, including one volunteer and one Ukrainian, and three cavalry divisions.

In the last days of retreat, during the defensive battles on the outskirts of Warsaw, two Assault Groups were formed in the Wieprz River area, subordinated to Marshal Jozef Pilsudski personally. Jozef Pilsudski personally.

They included three divisions from the 4th Army:

And two divisions from the 3rd Army:

and the cavalry brigade of Colonel Feliks Jaworski.

The first shock group was concentrated in the Deblin area. Marshal Pilsudski himself placed his command post near this group (at the 14th Division of General Daniel Konarzewski). Next to it, by the 16th Division, was General Skierski. General Edward Smigly-Rydz stood by the 1st Legion Infantry Division. The highest level commanders were placed by the divisions primarily in order to raise the morale of the army, to strengthen the belief in the success of the operation.

Polish Army participating in the Battle of Warsaw had 113-123 thousand soldiers, 500 cannons and over 1780 machine guns, 2 squadrons of airplanes, dozens of tanks and armored cars and several armored trains.

The Military Governorship of Warsaw, established on July 29, 1920 by the Minister of Military Affairs in order to establish order and public security as well as to organize defense in the besieged city, was also active throughout the battle. The Governor combined the duties of military commander and head of civil administration. General Franciszek Latinik was appointed the Military Governor of Warsaw.

In the night from 5th to 6th August 1920 in Belvedere a general concept of how the battle should be fought was being worked out. They returned to the ideas that had been on the minds of the whole Polish military leadership since the end of July. The intention was to stop the Red Army attack in front of Warsaw with part of the forces, and to recreate operational reserves on the right wing and use them to strike at the southern flank of the enemy.

On August 6th, in the morning, Marshal Pilsudski finally chose the location for the concentration of troops for the counter-attack. From among those proposed by the Chief of General Staff, Tadeusz Rozwadowski, near Garwolin or the Wieprz River, the Marshal decided on the latter place. The representative of the French military mission, General Maxime Weygand, preferred a concentration area close to Warsaw and a shallow, less risky flanking maneuver with the possibility of deepening the defense toward the capital. The Marshal decided to move the strike group to the south, beyond the Wieprz River line, and perform a deep maneuver not only on the wings of the Soviet Western Front, but also to its rear.

On the afternoon of August 6, order number 8358 was issued

“The rapid advance of the enemy deep into the country, and his serious attempts to break through the Bug River to Warsaw, induce the Supreme Command to move the northeastern front to the line of the Vistula River with the simultaneous acceptance of the great battle of Warsaw.

In short, the planned maneuver was based on a sudden break between the Polish and Soviet armies and on a deep secret regrouping of Polish divisions in such a way as to take up the defense of the capital based on the defenses on the Vistula, Narew, and Orzyc rivers as well as the bridgehead Modlin-Warsaw. This counterattack was to be made under the cover of the armies standing on the Bug River and in the south.

During the night from August 8th to 9th, General Tadeusz Rozwadowski worked out special operational order 10,000, which was the final modification of the plan for the Battle of Warsaw. It assumed additional reinforcement of Northern Front and imposed on General Sikorski”s 5th Army not only defensive tasks, but also offensive ones. The order ended with the words: with legs and valor of Polish infantry we must win this battle.

On August 12, Józef Piłsudski left Warsaw for his headquarters in Puławy. Before leaving, he tendered his resignation as Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief to Prime Minister Witos. In his letter to the Prime Minister, he pointed out that, in his opinion, since the peace talks with the Bolsheviks had brought nothing, Poland had to count on the help of the Entente countries, and these made it dependent on the Marshal”s departure. However, Witos did not accept the resignation.

In the first days of August, the staff of diplomatic missions left Warsaw for Poznań and their archives were evacuated. Heads of diplomatic missions left the city on August 14th. Only Nuncio Achilles Ratti (later Pope Pius XI) and an Italian deputy stayed in Warsaw.

Battle on the outskirts of Warsaw

On August 13, the first day of the battle, there was a sudden attack by two Soviet tactical compounds, one division from Lazarevich”s 3rd Army and one from Sollohub”s 16th Army. They were advancing on Warsaw from the northeastern direction.

Two divisions of the Red Army, which had recently marched over 600 kilometers, struck near Radzymin, broke through the defenses of Colonel Boleslaw Jazwinski”s 11th Division and captured Radzymin. Then one of them moved towards Praga, and the other turned right – towards Nieporęt and Jablonna. The dramatic battle of Radzymin began, which in Polish legend is sometimes mistakenly considered the “Battle of Warsaw”.

This failure prompted the commander of the Polish Northern Front to order General Sikorski”s 5th Army to launch an offensive from the Modlin area to relieve General Latinik”s 1st Army, which was covering Warsaw.

On the following day, that is on August 14, fierce fights took place along the eastern and south-eastern fortifications of the Warsaw forebridge – on the section from Wiązowna to Radzymin area. Polish forces put up a tough resistance everywhere and the advancing Soviet forces did not achieve any serious success. A more stable situation in the area of the Warsaw defence took place in the area south of Radzymin, on the section from Stara Milosna through Wiązowna, Emów up to Swierk, where the units of the XXIX Infantry Brigade, commanded by Colonel Stanislaw Wrzalinski, offered fierce and effective resistance from August 13 to 16.

On August 15th a concentrated offensive of Polish divisions (10th Division of General Zeligowski and 1st Lithuanian-Byelorussian Division of General Jan Rządkowski), after fierce battles lasting all day, brought a great success. Radzymin was regained and Polish units returned to the positions lost two days before. On August 16th intensive fights were still taking place on the battle lines in front of Warsaw, but situation of Polish forces was partially improving.

In the Modlin zone the military actions did not provide a clear-cut solution at first either.

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Fights on the river Wkra

General Sikorski”s 5th Army, which on the order of the commander of the Northern Front moved on August 14 to attack in the direction of Nasielsk, was making progress. However, these were successes of local importance.

Only two days later, on August 16, a concentrated attack of Sikorski”s army, launched from the south-eastern forts of Modlin and from above the Wkra River, led to the capture of Nasielsk. It gave an opportunity to continue further operations on Serock and Pultusk.

On the left wing of the Polish front, the Red Army had the advantage. Shuvaev”s 4th Army and Gaia”s 3rd Cavalry Corps were advancing on Plock, Wloclawek, and Brodnica, and in the Nieszawa area they had already begun forcing the Vistula River.

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Counterstrike from the Wieprz River

Influenced by the news coming from Warsaw and Wloclawek and Brodnica, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army decided to launch an offensive maneuver from the lower Wieprz River.

Jozef Pilsudski led the counter-offensive from the Wieprz River on August 16, 1920 with the forces of 5 divisions. The 4th Army, which he personally commanded, consisted of the 14th Poznan Division, the 16th Pomeranian Division, and the 21st Highland Division. Its forces consisted of 27,500 infantry soldiers, 950 cavalrymen, 461 machine guns and 90 field guns.

The divisions of the Assault Group, having a huge advantage over the weak Soviet Mozyr Group, moved with a wide front and reached the Warsaw-Brest highway already on the second day of the attack. It promised to get to the rear of Soviet forces near Warsaw. The right wing of the attack was covered by the 3rd Legion Infantry Division marching to Wlodawa and Brest. Near Warsaw the Soviet Army was bound by a vigorous offensive of a part of Polish forces from the forebridge, supported by tanks attacking in the direction of Minsk Mazowiecki, so called 2nd Assault Group of Stanislaw Wrzalinski.

The progress made already on the first day of the attack was considerable. The 3rd Legion Infantry Division took Wlodawa. The 1st Infantry Division of the Legions occupied the section Wisznice – Wohyń, while the 21st Mountain Infantry Division and the Wielkopolska divisions 14 and 16 reached the border of the Wilga River, took Garwolin, and advanced patrols near Wiązowna. The 2nd Legion Infantry Division, transferred from the western bank of the Vistula River, took over the role of the attack group”s reserve.

On August 17 Polish forces reached a line Biala Podlaska – Miedzyrzec – Siedlce – Kaluszyn – Minsk Mazowiecki.

Pilsudski went to Warsaw and on August 18 gave the appropriate orders to regroup. The purpose of this regrouping was to create a pursuit group, which, especially on the right flank, was to cut off the enemy”s retreat to the line Brest-on-the-Bug, Bialystok-Osowiec, and thus entrap him. As part of the central front, still under the personal command of Commander-in-Chief, a new 2nd Army was formed under the command of General Rydz-Smigly. It consisted of: 1DP Leg., 3DP Leg., 4 BK, 21 DP, 1 DLit.-Bialy. (from 1st Army), 41 pp (from 5th Army) and “Jaworski”s ride”. This Army received orders to pursue along the Międzyrzecz-Bialystok axis, and at the same time to garrison Brest-on-the-Bug. The 4th Army was to lead the pursuit along the Kaluszyn-Mazowieck axis. In north-east direction, along axis Warsaw-Ostrów-Lomza, 1st Army reduced to 8 and 10 divisions was to lead the pursuit. The 5th Army was to operate in the direction of Przasnysz-Mlawa and to cut off and finally disperse the enemy”s 4th and 15th Armies and Gaia”s Cavalry Corps. The 3rd Army (7DP and 2 DP Leg.), transported by rail to Lublin, was to cover operations from the east. It can be briefly said that the guiding idea of the Commander-in-Chief was an operation that would “throw” the enemy on the German border and cut him off from the roads leading east. However, this guideline was not fully realized, as the 1st Army delayed its action and ultimately headed northeast into the cities in the direction of the 5th Army”s action (northwest), thus allowing the 3rd and 15th Soviet Armies to retreat eastward.

In his book, Pilsudski characterizes this final period of the battle in the following way: Not a poor contredanse, but a furious gallop was the music of war! It was not the day that diverged from the day, but the hour that diverged from the hour! The kaleidoscope of the furious galloping was not allowing any of the Soviet commanders to stop at any of the danced figures. The kaleidoscope of furious galloping was not allowing anyone in command on the Soviet side to stop at any of the danced figures, which were bursting in an instant, bringing to our frightened eyes completely new characters and new situations, which completely surpassed any assumptions, plans and intentions.

At the same time the rest of the Polish army went on the counter-offensive along the entire length of the front. The 5th Army from above the Wkra River struck the 15th and 3rd Bolshevik Armies. Due to the (explained below) lack of communication with the command and soldier fatigue, most of the Soviet forces went into an uncoordinated retreat. Part of the Soviet forces, the 3rd Gaia Khan Cavalry Corps (two divisions) and part of the 4th and 15th Armies (six divisions), unable to break through to the east, crossed the German border on August 24, 1920, and were interned on East Prussian territory.

Breaking the ciphers of the Red Army

According to documents discovered in recent years and disclosed in August 2005 by the Central Military Archives, the Red Army”s ciphers were broken by Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski as early as September 1919. The Polish counteroffensive maneuver succeeded thanks to, among other things, the knowledge of the Soviet plans and orders and the ability to use this knowledge by the Polish command.

As Mieczysław Ścieżyński wrote about the work of Polish radio intelligence during the conflict in question, ”the enemy himself kept our command thoroughly informed about his moral and material condition, about his numbers and losses, about his movements, about his victories and defeats, about his intentions and orders, about the location of his headquarters and the dislocation areas of his divisions, brigades and regiments.

One of the most important successes of Polish intelligence during the Battle of Warsaw was intercepting and deciphering the radio dispatch of XVI Army command of August 13th, concerning the capture of Warsaw:

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Map and command

The success of an operation plan involving such a deep maneuver depends largely on keeping its contents deeply secret.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army captured the plan of Polish operations near Dubienka already on August 13. The commander of Stefan Batory Volunteer Regiment, Major Waclaw Drohojowski, was killed there. A mapbook was found on his person, and in it a battle order together with a map. The Russians, however, came to the conclusion that it was a Polish mystification, which was to force them to cover the left wing of the attack grouping and thus stop the attack on Warsaw.

Getting a radio station

One of the most important episodes of the Battle of Warsaw was the capture of the headquarters of the 4th Soviet Army in Ciechanow by the Kalisz 203rd Cavalry Regiment under Major Zygmunt Podhorski on August 15th, and with it the headquarters of the army, warehouses, and one of the two radio stations used by the army to communicate with the command in Minsk. The Poles knew that at that time the other radio station was turned off because it was moving to another location. At that time, the front commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky ordered the 4th Army to turn back to the southeast and strike at General Sikorski”s army, which was fighting near Nasielsk.

The quick and effective deciphering of that order by the Poles made it possible to analyze the situation and led to a quick decision to tune the Warsaw transmitter to the Soviet radio frequency and to start effective jamming of much more distant transmitters from Minsk. For Warsaw, on the same frequency, was broadcasting for two days without a break the texts of Holy Scripture – the only sufficiently extensive texts that the command of the Citadel, where the Polish transmitter was located, ad hoc managed to give to the radio operators for continuous broadcasting.

The possibility of giving false orders to Soviet troops wandering in Pomerania was also considered, but the idea was abandoned, not wanting to expose themselves as having broken Soviet ciphers.

Having lost its headquarters and communications with the front command, the 4th Army lost its coordination of operations. Not having received the orders from Minsk (to be exact: not being able to hear them) changing the direction of its operations, this army with its six divisions continued to move along the line determined by the last received orders, which drove it as far as the present eastern part of Torun (later some military historians ironically said that this army at that time was fighting not against Poland, but against the Treaty of Versailles). In this way it was eliminated from the battle for Warsaw.

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Hungarian material aid – ammunition

Allied aid from France did not arrive because of the blockade of supplies by Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, which occupied Zaolzie on July 28, 1920. The Second Socialist International, supporting the Bolsheviks, agitated dockers and sailors to block the reloading of supplies reaching Poland by sea through the port of Danzig. At the beginning of July 1920, the Hungarian government of Prime Minister Pál Teleki decided to help Poland by delivering military supplies at the critical moment of the war, free of charge and at its own expense, via Romania and further along the Czerniowce-Kolomyja-Stryj railroad line: 48 million Mauser rifle cartridges, 13 million Mannlicher cartridges, artillery ammunition, 30,000 Mauser rifles and several million spare parts, 440 field kitchens, 80 field ovens. On August 12, 1920 a transport of 22 million Mauser cartridges from Manfréd Weiss factory in Czepel reached Skierniewice by this route.

As a result of the Battle of Warsaw (and the subsequent Battle of Nieman), on October 15, Polish and Soviet delegations concluded an armistice in Riga, and in March 1921, on its basis, a peace treaty was concluded, which until the aggression of the USSR against Poland on September 17, 1939, for eighteen and a half years regulated Polish-Soviet relations and delineated the Polish eastern border.

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Losses

The losses on the Polish side amounted to: about 4,500 killed, 22,000 wounded and 10,000 missing. The damage done to the Soviets is unknown. It is assumed that about 25 thousand Bolsheviks were killed, 60 thousand were taken prisoners of war, and 45 thousand were interned by the Germans.

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Controversy

Tukhachevsky blamed Joseph Stalin for the defeat of the Russian forces in the Battle of Warsaw. He claimed that Kamenev”s directive to transfer the 1st Horse Army and the 12th Army from the South-Western Front to his command was blocked by Stalin.

Others claimed (Shaposhnikov, Budionny, Tulenev, Golikov, Timoshenko, Voroshilov) that the real responsibility fell on Tukhachevsky, who poorly organized the operation to capture Warsaw.

It is significant that all these officers survived 1937, reached high ranks and lived to a long age. Those who claimed that Stalin was to blame ended their lives together with Marshal Tukhachevsky in 1937 as part of the so-called Great Purge.

In 1920, there was a dispute in Poland about the authorship of the plan of the Battle of Warsaw and the name of the winner. From a purely technical point of view, the author of the plan was General Rozwadowski, but Marshal Pilsudski, as Commander-in-Chief, considered himself as the constructor of the Warsaw victory. Also, many historians admit that the concept of the battle belonged to the Marshal, which was later put on paper by General Rozwadowski. However, there is plenty of evidence confirming Piłsudski”s terrible mental condition.

All operational orders from 12th to 16th August bear the signature of General Rozwadowski, who is regarded by some historians as the main architect of the victory over the Bolsheviks. In addition, controversy is aroused by the fact that, on 12 August, Piłsudski tendered his resignation from his post to Prime Minister Witos and went on the night of 12-13 August to the Bobowa estate to his daughters and future wife Aleksandra. It should be noted, however, that on August 13th at 10 a.m. he was already in Deblin, where he held a briefing with Generals Śmigły-Rydz and Skierski, and spent August 14th and 15th inspecting the regiments of the Central Front.

The opposition made the situation even more complicated by putting forward many candidates to discredit Piłsudski, to whom Poles were supposed to owe the victory in the Battle of Warsaw, including Haller, Weygand and Sikorski, besides Rozwadowski. It was also done by emphasising the “miraculousness” of the victory over the Vistula River.

Today we can say with certainty that there remain two authors of the victory: Rozwadowski and Piłsudski; unfortunately, there is no objective view of the entire dispute, which is highly controversial and contains quite a few inaccuracies. Operational orders, education, and planning skills alone speak for Rozwadowski, but the letter of August 15 would point to Piłsudski. It does not change the fact that Poland achieved victory thanks to the unanimous cooperation of the high command, which in a critical time for the country was able to hide grudges and personal dislikes.

In the history of the art of war, however, the Battle of Warsaw is an example of a decisive maneuver whose final effect was achieved by the commander”s keen thinking, the diligent work of the staff, and the high skills of officers and soldiers on the battlefield.

In his book Tactical Genius in Battle, published in 1979, Simon Goodough, a popularizer of war and military history, listed Józef Piłsudski as the winner of 27 greatest battles in world history. He listed him among such strategists as Themistocles, Alexander the Great, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, and Condeus.

The significance of the Battle of Warsaw is still a subject of historical research. Lord Edgar Vincent D”Abernon, the British ambassador in pre-war Poland, called it in the title of his book “The eighteenth decisive battle in the history of the world”. In an article published in August 1930, he wrote: “The modern history of civilization knows of few events of greater significance than the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, while it knows of not a single one which is less appreciated…. If the Battle of Warsaw had ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks, it would have been a turning point in the history of Europe, because there is no doubt that with the fall of Warsaw central Europe would have been open to the communist propaganda and the Soviet invasion (…). The task of political writers… is to explain to the European public opinion that in 1920 Europe was saved by Poland”.

Polish historian and expert on Polish-Russian relations, Professor Andrzej Nowak, in his book Klęska imperium zła. The Year 1920 proves the thesis that the Polish victory saved Western Europe from the communist revolution: “In Lenin”s correspondence with Stalin at the end of July 1920, there is a systematic theme: if we kill Poland, we will get Lvov – this was the perspective of Stalin, who was bogged down with his front not on the heroic defense of Warsaw, but of Lvov. Well, Stalin said that first they would conquer the said Lvov, then all Galicia up to Krakow would be Bolshevik and Russians would go further, they would smash Czech Republic, Hungary and Rumania, they would enter Vienna and finally they would sovietize also Italy. Stalin mentions these specific countries, which were to fall victim to the advancing Soviet offensive as early as 1920. These ambitious plans for the conquest of virtually the entire European continent lay in ruins. They fell into ruin because Poland stopped them.”

French General Louis Faury in one of his articles in 1928 compared the Battle of Warsaw to the Battle of Vienna: “Two hundred years ago Poland, under the walls of Vienna, saved the Christian world from the Turkish danger; on the Vistula and on the Niemen, this noble nation gave again to the civilized world a service which had not been sufficiently appreciated.”

In turn, the British historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote in his book The Battle of Warsaw 1920: “Shielding central Europe from the Marxist plague, the Battle of Warsaw turned back the hands of the Bolshevik clock … stopped the potential outbreak of social discontent in the West, almost nullifying the Bolsheviks” experiment.

In 1930 a commemorative medal was struck with the following text On the tenth anniversary of the Miracle on the Vistula (reverse) and Pope Pius XI did not leave Warsaw in 1920 (obverse), issued by the Warsaw Mint and designed by Stefan Rufin Koźbielewski.

On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Warsaw, both by a resolution of the Polish Sejm of the 8th term of June 13, 2019, and by a resolution of the Polish Senate of the 9th term of October 18, 2019, the year 2020 was established as the Year of the Battle of Warsaw. A special edition of the Sejm Chronicle was dedicated to the patrons of the year 2020.

On 21 August 2020, as part of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Warsaw, a plaque was unveiled on the building of the Citizens” Resursa at 64 Krakowskie Przedmieście Street in Warsaw. The plaque commemorates the activities of the Military Governorship of Warsaw and Governor Franciszek Latinik during the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920.

In 2020, in connection with the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Warsaw, the National Bank of Poland introduced a collector”s banknote of 20 zloty 100th anniversary of the Battle of Warsaw.

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