Battle of the Yarmuk

gigatos | June 10, 2022

Post Views: 17

Summary

The Battle of the Yarmūk (Arabic: معركة اليرموك, Maʿrakat al-Yarmūk, or of the Yarmuk, also referred to as Hieromyax) was actually a six-day-long military campaign between the Rashidun Caliphate and the Eastern Roman Empire in August 636 near the Yarmūk River along what is now the border between Syria and Jordan, southeast of the Sea of Galilee. The campaign proved to be one of the most decisive events of arms in history and marked the first major wave of Islamic expansion after Muhammad”s death, thus sanctioning Islam”s rapid advance into the provinces of Syria and Palestine. The battle is considered a memorable feat by Khālid b. al-Walīd, which cemented his reputation as a great strategist and cavalry commander.

The Yarmūk River Gorge (a left tributary of the Jordan River) is a location in southern Syria near the Golan Heights. A series of harsh battles were fought here between the Byzantine army and that of the Muslim Arabs, led by Khālid b. al-Walīd, including the Battle of Thaniyyat al-ʿUqāb. The latter massively turned all their military might against the Romans, who are said to have been led by Emperor Heraclius I himself.

There had already been some skirmishes and raids carried out by the Arabs a couple of years earlier, all of which ended in the destruction of Roman camps and the conquest of the cities where they were stationed, in the Transjordan region. The Eastern Roman emperor Heraclius I had just emerged from a bloody war against the Persians, of whom he had been proved right at great cost. Nevertheless, he decided to retaliate against the Arab attacks that threatened the borders of his empire. The happy choice of terrain made by Khālid b. al-Walīd was already worthwhile in setting the final outcome of the battle in favor of the Muslim Arabs.

Rather than battle, it is correct to speak of the “Yarmūk campaign,” since the clashes were repeated for over a month. The Romans, under the operational command of Vahano and Theodore Tritorius, were supported by the Ghassanid Arabs, also Christians, under the command of their ruler Jabala ibn al-Ayham. The total number of Christian fighters was 40,000-70,000 men (but with serious logistical problems), while that of the Muslims was much smaller, yet able to sustain themselves without demoralization problems until the repeated clashes that occurred along the span of July-August. At that time of year the heat was in fact very sensitive for the Byzantine troops, not perfectly adapted to the climate and quite heavily armed (at least compared to the Arab-Muslims), and within whose ranks there was no shortage of friction between Arabs, Greeks and Armenians, among others.

Roman sources spoke of treachery on Vahān”s part, even accusing the Damascus treasury official, Manṣūr, son of Sergius, of failure to help. The reality is that the superior Arab mobility, its ability to cope with the harsh bivouac life and the high morale generated by their new faith prevailed over the fairly static Byzantine tactics, their supply problems and the demoralization caused by the failure to pay soldiers regularly, not to mention the superior tactical and strategic capabilities of the “Sword of Allah.”

During the last of the wars between Byzantium and Persia, in 610, Heraclius became emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire after dethroning Phocas. Meanwhile, the Sasanian Persians conquered Mesopotamia and in 611 devastated Syria by penetrating into Anatolia, where they occupied Caesarea Mazaca (present-day Kayseri). Heraclius, in 612, succeeded in expelling the Persians from Anatolia, but was decisively defeated in 613 when he launched a major offensive in Syria against the Persians. In the following decade, the Persians succeeded in their quest to conquer Palestine and Egypt. Meanwhile, Heraclius prepared for a counteroffensive by rebuilding his army. Nine years later, in 622, Heraclius launched his counteroffensive. After gaining several successes over the Persians and their allies in the Caucasus and Armenia, Heraclius, in 627, launched a winter offensive against the Persians in Mesopotamia after which he gained a decisive victory at the Battle of Nineveh and then threatened the Persian capital Ctesiphon. Discredited by all these defeats, Khosraw II was dethroned and killed in a coup led by his son Kavadh II, who negotiated a peace with Byzantium, agreeing to withdraw from all territories occupied by the Persians but once belonging to the Byzantine Empire, returning them to Byzantium. Heraclius brought the “True Cross” back to Jerusalem in a triumphal ceremony in 629.

Meanwhile, in Arabia, the Muslim prophet Muhammad was preaching a new religion, Islam, succeeding in uniting most of Arabia under his own authority. When Muhammad died in June 632, Abū Bakr was chosen as Caliph, that is, his political successor. There were, however, some problems after this succession. Some Arab tribes revolted against Abū Bakr, thus began the Wars of the Ridda. Abū Bakr, having declared war on the “apostates,” defeated their resistance as early as 632, and by 633 Arabia was united under the central authority of the Caliph based in Medina.

After crushing the revolts Abū Bakr began a war of conquest beginning in Iraq, the most prosperous province of the Persian Empire. He sent his most brilliant general, Khālid b. al-Walīd, known as “the Sword of God,” with the aim of invading the empire ruled by the Sasanian dynasty. After several victorious campaigns against the Persians and the conquest of Iraq, Abū Bakr”s confidence increased, and once Khālid established his stronghold in Iraq, Abū Bakr proclaimed a call to arms to invade Syria in February 634.

The Muslim invasion of Syria was a series of well-planned and well-coordinated military operations that employed strategy rather than sheer force to circumvent Byzantine defensive measures. The Muslim armies, however, soon proved too small to succeed against the imperial counteroffensive, and their commanders consequently called for additional reinforcements. Khālid was sent by Abū Bakr from Iraq to Syria with stout reinforcements and entrusted with leading the invasion. In July 634, the Romeis suffered a decisive defeat at Ajnādayn. Damascus fell in September 634, followed by the Battle of Fahl where the last significant Roman garrison in Palestine was defeated and routed.

Caliph Abū Bakr perished in 634. His successor, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, was determined to continue the expansion of the Rashidun Caliphate in Syria. Although previous campaigns led by Khālid had led to notable successes, he was replaced by Abū ʿUbayda. Having subdued the southern part of Israel, Muslim forces advanced, conquering Tiberias and Baalbek without meeting much resistance and succeeding in taking Emesa in early 636, continuing almost unchallenged in their goal of conquering the Levant.

Having seized Emesa, the Muslims were now not far from the Byzantine stronghold of Aleppo and Antioch, where Heraclius resided. Seriously alarmed by the series of defeats, Heraclius prepared for a counteroffensive to recover the lost territories. In 635 the Persian emperor Yazdgard III sought an alliance with the Byzantine emperor. Heraclius had his daughter (according to other sources, his granddaughter, being his grandfather) Manyanh married to Yazdegerd III, so as to corroborate the alliance. As Heraclius prepared for a major counteroffensive in the Levant, Yazdegerd was to lead a simultaneous counterattack in Iraq, in what should have been a well-coordinated effort. However, when Heraclius launched his offensive in May 636, Yazdegerd failed to coordinate probably because of the miserable conditions in his government, leading to the failure of the plan of the simultaneous attack on the Arabs on two fronts.Umar won a decisive victory over Heraclius at Yarmuk, and three months later (November 636) Yazdegerd was defeated with his army at the Battle of al-Qādisiyya, leading to the end of Sasanian control of the territories west of Persia.

Byzantine preparations began in late 635, and as early as May 636 Heraclius had at his disposal a large army concentrated at Antioch in northern Syria. The assembled army consisted of contingents of Byzantines, Slavs, Franks, Georgians, Armenians, and Ghassanid Christian Arabs.This force was divided into five armies, and the joint command of the expedition was entrusted to Theodore Trithourios the Sacellarian. Vahān, an Armenian who had previously headed the garrison of Emesa, became the field commander of the entire army, and had under his command an army composed solely of Armenians. Buccinator (Qanatir), a Slavic prince, commanded the Slavs, while Jabala ibn al-Ayham, king of the Ghassanid Arabs commanded an army composed solely of Christian Arabs. The remaining contingents, all from the motherland and other European Byzantine possessions, were placed under the command of Gregory and Dairjan. Heraclius himself supervised the operation from Antioch. Byzantine sources mention Niceta, son of the Persian general Shahrbaraz, among the commanders, but it is unclear which army he commanded.

At that time, the army of the Rāshidūn was divided into four groups: one under the command of ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ in Israel, one led by Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana in Jordan, one entrusted to Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān in the Damascus-Cesarea region, and the last under the command of Abū ʿUbayda and Khālid b. al-Walīd in Emesa. Since the Muslim forces were divided, Heraclius tried to take advantage of this by using the strategy of clashing with his entire army against each of the small armies into which the Muslim army was divided, before they could unite into a large army: by forcing the Muslims to retreat, or by destroying the Muslim armies separately one at a time, he would thus accomplish his goal of recovering the lost territories. Reinforcements were sent to Caesarea under the command of Heraclius” son Constantine III probably to keep occupied the Yazīd forces that were besieging the city. The Byzantine army left Antioch and northern Syria around mid-June 636.

The Byzantine army was to operate according to the following plan:

The Muslims found out about Heraclius” preparations at Shayzar from Roman prisoners. Having understood Heraclius” plan to attack separately with a large army each of the small armies into which the Muslim army was divided so as to destroy them easily, Khālid advised Abū ʿUbayda to withdraw troops from the Palestian and northern and central Syria, and to concentrate the entire Rashidun army in one place. Abū ʿUbayda ordered the concentration of the entire army in the vast plain near al-Jābiya, as the control of the area made cavalry charges possible while facilitating the arrival of reinforcements from Caliph ʿUmar so that a united and strong force could be deployed against the Byzantine armies. The strategic location of that place had an additional advantage for the Muslims: its proximity to the natural Caliphal fortress of Najd, in which they could find shelter in case of retreat. Instructions were also given to return the jizya (tribute) to the people who had paid it. However, once a large army was concentrated in Jabiya, the Muslims were exposed to raids by allied Byzantine-Gassanid forces. Setting up camp in the region was also precarious because a large Byzantine force was garrisoned in Caesarea and could have attacked the Muslim rear guard as they faced the Byzantine army. On Khālid”s advice, the Muslim forces retreated to Darʿa (or Dara) and Dayr Ayyūb, covering the distance between the Yarmuk Gorge and the lava plains (ḥarra), and establishing a line of encampments in the eastern part of the Yarmuk plain. This was a strong defensive position, and these maneuvers forced the Muslims and Byzantines into a decisive battle, something the latter had tried to avoid. During these maneuvers, there were no clashes other than a minor one between Khālid”s elite light cavalry and the Byzantine vanguard.

The battlefield is located about 65 km southeast of the Golan Heights, a mountainous region that currently lies on the current border between Israel, Jordan and Syria, east of the Sea of Galilee. The battle was fought in the Yarmuk Plain, enclosed in its western borders by a deep ravine known as Wadi al-Raqqad, which is about 200 m deep. This gorge joins the Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan River, to the south. To the north is the al-Jābiya road and to the east are the hills of Azra, although these hills were outside the actual battlefield. Strategically there was only one relief in the battlefield: a 100 m high hillock known as Tell al-Jumʿa (“gathering hill” in Arabic), and it allowed Muslim troops concentrated there to look down on the entire Yarmuk plain from above. The gorge to the west of the battlefield was accessible in a few places in 636, and was crossable by a bridge at the present-day village of Kafir al-Māʾ.Logistically, the Yarmuk plain possessed enough water and pasture to support both armies. The plain was also ideal for cavalry maneuvers.

Most early Islamic accounts of the battle estimate the size of the Muslim armies between 24,000 and 40,000 and the size of the Byzantine armies between 100,000 and 400,000. Modern estimates of the size of the two armies vary: estimates for the Byzantine army are between 80,000 and 150,000 warriors, with some downward estimates as 50,000 and 15,000-20,000. Estimates for the Rāshidūn army vary between 25,000 and 40,000 fighters. These estimates were made by studying the logistical capabilities of the fighters, the sustainability of their respective bases of operations, and the overall limitations of soldiers available to both the Byzantines and the Arabs. Most scholars, however, agree that the Byzantine army and its allies were numerically superior to the Muslim troops.

The army of the Rāshidūn

During a war meeting, the command of the Muslim army was transferred to Khālid by Abū ʿUbayda, overall commander of the Muslim army.After assuming command, Khālid reorganized his army into 36 infantry and four cavalry contingents, with his elite cavalry, the mobile guard, held as a reserve. The army was organized in the formation known as Tabiʿa (a narrow, defensive infantry formation.The army was deployed on a 12-kilometer front, looking westward, with its left wing arranged south of the Yarmūk River one mile before the beginning of the Wadi al-Allan gorges. The right wing of the army was placed on the al-Jābiya road in the north along the heights of Tell al-Jumʿa, with substantial distances between the divisions so that their front matched that of the Byzantine battle line at 13 km. The center of the army was given to Abū ʿUbayda b. al-Jarrāḥ (left center) and Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana (right center). The left wing was placed under the command of Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān while the right wing was given to ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ. The center and the left and right wings were given cavalry regiments, to be used as a reserve for the counterattack in case they were forced back by the Byzantine attack. Behind the center was the mobile guard under Khālid”s personal command. If and when he was too busy with the operations to command the entire army, Ḍirār ibn al-Azwar would command the mobile guard. In the course of the battle, Khālid would repeatedly make critical and decisive use of his reserve.Khālid sent some scouts to keep an eye on the movements of the Byzantines.In late July 636, Vahān sent Jabala with his army of lightly armed Christian Arabs on reconnaissance, but they were repulsed by the mobile guard. After this minor clash, no more fighting occurred for about a month.

Helmets used by the Arabs included gold helmets similar to the silver helmets of the Sasanian Empire. The usbergo was commonly used to protect the face, neck and cheeks. Heavy leather sandals and Roman-style sandal boots were also typical of Muslim soldiers at the time of the first conquests. Infantry soldiers were more heavily armed than cavalry soldiers. Large wooden or wicker shields were employed. The Arabs also employed long-handled spears in battle, with infantry spears 2.5 m long and cavalry spears up to 5.5 m long. Swords used by infantry were short like the Roman gladius, but long swords typical of Sasanian soldiers were also used; long swords were generally used in battle by cavalrymen. Bows were about 2 m long, similar in size to the famous English longbow. The maximum range of the traditional Arab bow was about 150 m. The early Muslim archers, although they were infantry archers without the mobility of mounted regiments of archers, proved to be very effective in defending themselves against attacks by light cavalry and unarmored cavalry.

The Byzantine Army

A few days after the Muslims encamped at the Yarmuk plain, the Byzantine army, preceded by the lightly armed Ghassanids of Jabala, moved forward and established heavily fortified encampments north of the Wadi al-Raqqad. The right wing of the Byzantine army was located on the southern borders of the plain, near the Yarmuk River and about a mile before the beginning of the Wadi al-Allan Gorge. The Byzantines” left wing was placed to the north, a short distance from the beginning of the Jabiya Hills, and was relatively exposed. Vahān arranged the imperial army looking eastward, with a front about 13 km long, as it sought to cover the entire area between the Yarmuk Gorge in the south and the Roman road leading to Egypt in the north, and substantial gaps had been left between the Byzantine divisions. The right wing was commanded by Gregory while the left by Qanatir. The center was composed of Dairjan”s army and Vahān”s Armenian army, both under the overall command of Dairjan. The regular Roman heavy cavalry, the cataphracts, was distributed equally among the four armies, each employing its infantry in the vanguard and cavalry as a reserve in the rear. Vahān employed the Ghassanid Christian Arabs of Jabala, who mounted on horses and camels, as a skirmishing force that would protect the main army until his arrival. The earliest primary Islamic sources mention that Gregory”s army had used chains to hold its foot soldiers together, all of whom had taken an oath to perish. The chains were 10 men long and were used as proof of unwavering courage on the part of the men, who had shown their willingness to perish rather than flee in case of defeat. The chains were also used as insurance against a possible breakthrough by enemy cavalry. However, modern scholars suggest that the Byzantines had adopted the Greco-Roman military formation of the tortoise, in which soldiers would be arranged shoulder to shoulder with shields held aloft and with an organization of 10 to 20 men who would be fully protected by arrow and spear throwing shields, with each soldier offering cover to his comrade alongside.

Byzantine cavalry were armed with a long sword known as a spathion. They would also have had a long wooden lance known as a kontarion and a bow (toxarion) with forty arrows in each quiver, hanging from the saddle or belt. The heavy infantry, known as skoutatoi, had a sword and a short spear. Lightly armed Byzantine troops and archers carried a small shield, a bow, and a quiver of arrows. Armored cavalry were armed with a usbergo and helmet. Infantry were similarly equipped with a usbergo, helmet and wooden armor. Lamellar and scaled armor were also used.

Khālid”s strategy of withdrawing from occupied areas and concentrating all his troops in preparation for a decisive battle forced the Byzantines to concentrate their five armies into one in response. The Byzantines had for centuries avoided as much as possible clashing in decisive battles in the open field, and the concentration of their troops into a single army created logistical problems for which the Empire was not well prepared. Damascus was the nearest logistical base, but Manṣūr, who in fact ruled Damascus, could not fully supply the huge Byzantine army that had gathered on the Yarmuk plain. A number of clashes with the local populations regarding the requisitioning of supplies are reported in the sources, as the summer was ending resulting in a decline of pastureland. Greek court sources accused Vahān of treason for disobeying Heraclius” order not to clash with the Arabs in the open field. Given the size of the Muslim armies in the Yarmuk, however, Vahān had no other alternative. Relations between the various Byzantine commanders then became strained. There was a contest for command between Trithurios and Vahān, Jarajis (Georghios), and Qanatir (Buccinator). Jabala, the commander of the Ghassanid Christian Arabs, was largely and guiltily ignored, given the Ghassanid overlord”s knowledge of the place. An atmosphere of distrust with one another thus existed between Greeks, Armenians and Arabs. The longstanding struggles between the Chalcedonians and the Monophysite “heresy” certainly inflamed the rise of further tensions. Overall, this resulted in decreased coordination and poor battle planning, both of which were not minor causes of the Byzantine defeat at Yarmuk.

For a good understanding of the battle description, it is useful to know the divisions of the two sides. The battle lines of the Muslims and Byzantines were divided into four sections: the left wing, the left center, the right center, and the right wing. Note that the descriptions of the battle lines of the Muslims and Byzantines are exactly the opposite of each other (to give an example: the Muslim right wing clashed with the Byzantine left wing (see image).

Vahān received orders from Heraclius not to engage in battle before he attempted to postpone it by diplomacy. This was probably because Yazdegerd III”s troops were not yet ready for the offensive in Iraq. In fact, Vahān sent Gregory and later Jabala ibn al-Ayham to negotiate, although their attempts proved futile. Before the battle, at Vahān”s invitation, Khālid came to negotiate a peace, but he too came in vain. These negotiations postponed the battle for about a month.On the other side, Caliph ʿUmar, whose forces in al-Qādisiyya (Iraq) were threatened by an impending clash with the Sasanian armies, ordered Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ to enter into negotiations with the Persians and send emissaries to Yazdegerd III and his commander Rostam Farrokhzād, apparently inviting them to convert to Islam. This was most likely a stalling tactic employed by ʿUmar on the Persian front. of 6,000 troops, mostly from Yemen, to Khālid. This force included 1,000 Sahaba (Companions of Muhammad), including 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr, the first battle in Islamic history, as well as citizens of the highest rank, including al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwām, Abū Sufyān and his wife Hind bt. ʿUtba.

ʿUmar, apparently wishing to defeat the Byzantines first, employed the best Muslim troops at his disposal against them. The continuous reinforcements reaching the Muslim Arabs worried the Byzantines, who, fearing that the Muslims, with such reinforcements, would become even stronger, decided that they had no choice but to attack. The reinforcements that had been sent by the Muslims to the Yarmūk arrived in small bands, giving the impression of a continuous flow of reinforcements, so as to demoralize the Byzantines and force them to attack. The same tactic would later be employed during the battle of al-Qādisiyya.

Also read, battles – Siege of Jerusalem (1099)

Day 1

The battle began on August 15, 636. At dawn both armies deployed to prepare for battle less than a mile away. According to Islamic chronicles, before the battle began, George, the commander of a Byzantine right-center regiment, switched sides by converting to Islam; he would perish the same day fighting on the Muslim side. The battle began when the Byzantine army sent its champions to challenge the Muslim mubārizūn (lit. “champions”) to a duel. The mubārizūn were specially trained swordsmen and lancers, with the aim of slaughtering as many enemy commanders as possible on the battlefield, so as to damage the enemy”s morale. In the middle of the day, after losing several commanders in duels, Vahān ordered a limited attack with one-third of his infantry forces to test the Muslim army”s endurance and strategy and, by exploiting their overwhelming superiority in numbers and weapons, achieve a breakthrough at the points where the Muslim battle line was weak. However, the Byzantine assault lacked determination; many soldiers in the imperial army were incapable of holding their own against the Muslim veterans. The fighting was generally not fierce, although in some places it was particularly intense. Vahān did not reinforce his vanguard infantry, two-thirds of which was held in reserve, only one-third of which was employed to clash with the Muslims. At sunset both armies stopped fighting, according to the war traditions of the time, returning to their respective camps.

Day 2

Phase 1: On August 16, 636, Vahān decided in a war meeting to launch his attack before dawn, so as to catch the Muslim army unprepared as they were intent at that time on their morning prayers.He planned to have his two central armies clash with the Muslim center in an attempt to keep them in stalemate while the main arrows would be conducted against the wings of the Muslim army, which would be forced either back from the battlefield or pushed toward the center. To observe the battlefield, Vahān had a large pavilion built behind his right wing with a force of Armenian bodyguards. He ordered the army to prepare for the surprise attack.Unbeknownst to the Byzantines, Khālid, foreseeing the possibility of a surprise attack by the enemy, had prepared during the night a strong outpost line so as to cope with any surprises, and this gave the Muslims time to prepare for battle. In the center, the Byzantines did not press hard, intending to pin the center of the Muslim army in their position and prevent them from helping the rest of the Muslim army elsewhere. The center in this way remained stable.But on the wings the situation was different. Qanatir, commander of the Byzantine left wing consisting mainly of Slavs, attacked in force, and the Muslim infantry on the right wing was forced back. ʿAmr, the Muslim commander of the right wing, ordered his cavalry detachment to counterattack, thus neutralizing the Byzantine advance and stabilizing the battle line on the right for some time before Byzantine numerical superiority forced him to retreat toward the Muslim camp.

Phase 2: Khālid, aware of the situation in the wings, ordered the right wing cavalry to attack the northern flank of the Byzantine left wing while he with his mobile guard would attack the southern flank of the Byzantine left wing, while the Muslim right wing infantry would attack from the front. The attack from three sides forced the Byzantine left wing to abandon the positions it had gained on the Muslims, and ʿAmr thus regained the lost ground as he began to reorganize his troops in preparation for the coming clashes.The situation of the Muslim left wing placed under Yazīd”s command was considerably more serious. While the Muslim right wing was receiving assistance from the mobile guard, the left wing could not benefit from such help, and the numerical advantage the Byzantines had over the Muslims forced the Muslim warriors to fall back, with several fighters retreating to base camps. Here the Byzantines had broken through the bodies. The tortoise formation that Gregory”s army had adopted moved slowly but defended itself well against enemy attacks, repelling a counterattack by Yazīd”s cavalry. Despite stiff resistance, Yazīd”s warriors on the left wing were forced back into camps, and for a moment Vahān”s plan seemed to work. The center of the Muslim army was pinned to its positions and its flanks were forced back. However, none of the wings were broken, although their morale was seriously damaged.The retreating Muslim army met the fierce Arab women in the camps. Led by Hind, the Muslim women dismantled their tents and armed themselves with tent stakes charging their husbands and followers and singing an improvised song from the Battle of Uhud that had been directed against the Muslims.

O you who run to a faithful woman

This was enough to prompt the retreating Muslims to return to the battlefield.

Phase 3: After succeeding in stabilizing the position at the right wing, Khālid ordered that the cavalry of the mobile guard should give assistance to the left wing, which was now in trouble.Khālid detached a regiment under the command of Ḍirār b. al-Azwar and ordered it to attack the vanguard of Dairjan”s army (left center) so as to create a diversion and cause the Byzantine right wing to retreat from its advanced position. With the rest of the reserve cavalry he attacked Gregory”s flank. Once again, simultaneous attacks from the front and his flanks forced the Byzantines to fall back, but more slowly because they had to maintain their formation.At sunset the central armies stopped fighting each other and retreated to their original positions and both fronts returned to the lines they had occupied in the morning. Dairjan”s killing and the failure of Vahān”s battle plan left the numerically superior imperial army relatively demoralized, while Khālid”s victorious counterattacks gave his troops courage despite being outnumbered by the enemy.

Also read, biographies – John Constable

Day 3

On August 17, 636, Vahān reflected on the mistakes he had made the previous day when he had launched his attacks against the respective Muslim flanks and the fact that, after some initial successes, his soldiers had been pushed back. What grieved him most was the loss of one of his commanders.The Byzantine army decided to implement a less ambitious plan: Vahān now aimed to break through the Muslim army at specific points. He decided to press the relatively exposed right flank, where his mounted troops could conduct maneuvers more freely compared to the rugged terrain of the Muslim right wing. It was decided to charge at the junction of the Muslim right center and his left wing under the command of the Slavs of Qanatir, to split them in two and fight them separately.

Phase 1: The battle resumed with Byzantine attacks on the Muslim right flank and right center.After holding off the initial Byzantine attacks, the Muslim right wing began to fall back, followed by the right center. It is said that they again met with their wives who once again rebuked them. The fighting corps, however, managed to regroup a short distance from the camp and prepared to counterattack.

Step 2: Knowing that the Byzantine army was focused on the Muslim right, Khālid launched an attack with his mobile guard, along with the Muslim right flank cavalry. Khālid struck at the Byzantines” left-center right flank, and the Muslims” right-center reserve cavalry struck at the Byzantines” left-center left flank. Meanwhile, he ordered the Muslim right wing cavalry to strike at the Byzantine left flank. The fight soon turned into a bloodbath, with many casualties on both sides. Khālid”s timely attacks on the flanks once again enabled the Muslims to resist the Byzantine attacks forcing the Byzantines to return to the positions they had at the beginning of the battle.

Also read, biographies – Jean-François Millet

Day 4

August 18, 636, the fourth day, proved decisive.

Phase 1: Vahān decided to persist with the war plan of the previous day as he had been successful in inflicting damage on the Muslim right wing.Qanatir led two armies of Slavs against the Muslim right wing and right center with some assistance from the Armenians and Christian Arabs led by Jabala. The Muslim right wing and right center once again were forced to fall back.Khālid once again went into action with his mobile guard. He feared a general attack on a broad front that he would not be able to repel and as a precaution ordered Abū ʿUbayda and Yazīd on the left center and left wing respectively to attack the Byzantine armies on their respective fronts. Such an attack would have kept the Byzantines stalled and prevented a general advance of the imperial army.

Phase 2: Khālid divided his mobile guard into two divisions and attacked the Byzantine left-center flanks, while the Muslim right-center infantry attacked from the front. Under this maneuver on the flanks from three sides, the Byzantines were forced to fall back. Meanwhile, the Muslim right renewed its offensive with infantry attacking from the front and reserve cavalry attacking the northern flank of the Byzantine left wing. As the Byzantine left center retreated under Khālid”s three-sided attacks, the Byzantine left wing, having been exposed on its southern flank, also retreated.

While Khālid and his mobile guard were facing the Armenians throughout the afternoon, the situation on the other side was deteriorating. Byzantine mounted archers attacked the troops of Abū ʿUbayda and Yazīd with arrows, preventing them from penetrating the Byzantine lines. Many Muslim soldiers were blinded by Byzantine arrows on that day, which became therefore known as the “Day of the Lost Eyes.” Veteran Abu Sufyan is also believed to have lost an eye on that day. The Muslim armies fell back, except for a contingent led by ʿIkrima b. Abī Jahl, who was on the left of Abū ʿUbayda”s corps. ʿIkrimah covered the retreat of the Muslims with his cavalry of four hundred men, attacking the Byzantine vanguard while the other armies regrouped to counterattack and recover their lost positions. All the men of ʿIkrima, Khālid”s childhood friend, were seriously wounded or perished that day, including ʿIkrima himself.

Day 5

During Vahān”s fourth-day offensive, his troops had failed to achieve any breakthrough and suffered heavy losses, especially during counterattacks on the flanks of the mobile guard. At dawn on August 19, 636, the fifth day of battle, Vahān sent an emissary to the Muslim camp to negotiate a truce of a few days so that new negotiations could be held. He probably intended to buy time to reorganize his demoralized troops. But Khālid declined the offer because he wanted victory at any cost.Up to that point, the Muslim army had adopted a largely defensive strategy, but knowing that the Byzantines were now defiant, Khālid now decided to take the offensive by reorganizing his troops accordingly. All the cavalry regiments were gathered together into a powerful mounted force with the mobile guard acting as its core. The total strength of this cavalry army was around 8,000 mounted warriors, ideal for an offensive attack the next day. The rest of the day passed without any major events. Khālid intended to trap the Byzantine troops, cutting off all escape routes for them. There were three natural barriers, the three gorges in the battlefield with their steep ravines, Wadī al-Raqqād to the west, Wadī al-Yarmuk to the south and Wadī al-Allah to the east. The northern route should have been blocked by Muslim cavalry.There were, however, a few passages along the 200 m. deep ravines of Wadī al-Raqqād to the west, the most strategically important among them being at ʿAyn al-Dhakar, a bridge. Khālid sent Ḍirār with 500 horsemen at night to take possession of that bridge. Ḍirār moved around the Byzantines” northern flank and captured the bridge. This maneuver would prove decisive the next day.

Also read, biographies – George Moore (novelist)

Day 6

On August 20, 636, the last day of the battle, Khālid put into action a simple but bold plan of attack. With his massive cavalry force he intended to drive the Byzantine cavalry entirely out of the battlefield so that the infantry, which constituted the bulk of the imperial army, would be left without the help of the cavalry and would be exposed to attacks on the flanks and rear guard.At the same time he planned to make a determined attack to push the Byzantine army”s left flank toward the ravine to the west.

Phase 1: Khālid ordered a general attack on the Byzantine vanguard and galloped his cavalry against the Byzantines” left wing. Part of his cavalry clashed with the Byzantine left wing cavalry while the rest attacked the Byzantine left wing infantry rearguard. Meanwhile, the Muslim right wing pressed against it from the front. Under this attack from two sides, the Byzantine left wing was forced to fall back and collapsed and fell back to the Byzantine left center, disorienting it. The rest of the Muslim cavalry then attacked the Muslim left wing cavalry from behind as they faced the other half of the Muslim cavalry frontally, pushing them out of the battlefield to the north.The Muslim right wing infantry now attacked the Byzantine right center on its left flank while the Muslim right center attacked from the front.

Phase 2: Vahān, noticing the maneuvering of the immense Muslim cavalry, ordered his cavalry to get together, but did not do so sufficiently in time; before Vahān could organize his desperate heavy cavalry squadrons, Khālid had pushed back his cavalry to attack the concentrating Byzantine cavalry squadrons, attacking them from the front and flank while they were still getting into formation. The disorganized and disoriented Byzantine heavy cavalry was quickly routed and dispersed in a northerly direction, leaving the infantry to its fate.

Phase 3: With the Byzantine cavalry sent completely routed, Khālid turned against the Byzantine left center, which was already suffering attacks on both sides from the Muslim infantry. The Byzantine left center was attacked from behind by Khālid”s cavalry and finally broken.

Last phase: With the retreat of the Byzantine left center, a general Byzantine retreat began. Khālid ordered his cavalry to the north to block the northern escape route. The Byzantines retreated westward to the Wadī al-Raqqād where there was a bridge at ʿAyn al-Dhakar, where it was possible to cross the deep ravines of the Wadī al-Raqqād ravines. Ḍirār b. al-Azwar had, however, already taken possession of the bridge the night before on Khālid”s orders. A unit of 500 mounted troops had been sent to block this escape route. In fact, this was the route Khālid intended the Byzantines to retreat.The Byzantines were now surrounded on all sides. Some fell into the ravine, others tried to escape by jumping into the water, only to slam into the rocks below, while others were killed in the course of the fighting. Nevertheless, a large number of soldiers managed to escape the massacre. Jonah, the Greek informant to the caliphal army during the conquest of Damascus perished in this event of arms. The Muslims took no prisoners in this battle, although they might have captured some during the ensuing pursuit.Theodorus Trithurios perished on the battlefield, while Niceta managed to escape and reach Emesa. Jabala ibn al-Ayham also managed to escape and subsequently, for a short time, went over to the Muslim side, only to defect and return to serve in the Byzantine court.

Immediately after the battle ended, Khālid and his mobile guard moved north to pursue the retreating Byzantine soldiers; he found them near Damascus and attacked. In the ensuing fight the commander of the imperial army, the Armenian prince Vahān, who had escaped the fate of many of his soldiers in the Yarmūk clash, was killed. Khālid then entered Damascus where he is said to have been well received by the local population, winning it back.

When news of the disaster reached the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius in Antioch, he was furious: he condemned his own past evil deeds, including his incestuous marriage to his niece Martina.He would have tried to regain the province if he still had resources, but now he had neither the men nor the money to defend the province. He then retreated to the cathedral in Antioch, where he met with his advisers to decide on next steps. He accepted the fact that the defeat had occurred by divine decision, due to the sins of the locals including him. Heraclius then left Syria the same night, and it is said that at the time of his departure he bade a final farewell to Syria, saying:

Farewell, a long farewell to Syria, my righteous province. You are now in the hands of the infidels (the enemy). Peace be with you, O Syria – What a magnificent land you will be for the enemy.

Heraclius left Syria taking with him the holy relic of the True Cross, which was, along with other relics kept in Jerusalem, secretly transported by ship from Jerusalem to protect it from Arab invaders. The story goes that the Emperor was now afraid of water, and a floating bridge was built to enable Heraclius to cross the Bosporus to reach Constantinople. After abandoning Syria, the Emperor began to concentrate the remaining forces at his disposal to organize the defense of Anatolia and Egypt. Byzantine Armenia fell to the Muslims in 638-39 after Heraclius created a buffer zone in central Anatolia by ordering that all fortresses east of Tarsus be evacuated.In 639-642 Muslims invaded and conquered Byzantine Egypt, led by the same ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ who had commanded the right array of the Rāshidū caliphal army on the Yarmuk.

The Battle of Yarmuk can be considered one of the examples in military history of when a force inferior in numbers succeeded in defeating a force superior in numbers because it was better led by the general.

Byzantine commanders allowed the enemy to choose the battlefield. Even then there was no substantial tactical disadvantage. Khālid knew that he was going up against a numerically superior army, so apart from the last day of the battle, in the early days of the battle he thought mainly of defending himself having relatively limited resources. When he decided to counterattack on the last day of the battle, he did so by showing such ingenuity, courage, and foresight of enemy moves that none of the Byzantine commanders had been able to display. Even though he commanded a numerically inferior force and needed all the men he had at his disposal, he nevertheless had the courage and good idea to send a cavalry regiment the night before to take possession of a vanishing point where he predicted the enemy army would attempt to retreat.

Khālid ibn al-Walīd was one of the most talented cavalry commanders in history, and his use of cavalry in the course of battle proves how he understood the potential strengths and weaknesses of his cavalry. His mobile guard moved quickly from point to point, always changing the course of events in favor of the Muslims wherever it fought.

Vahān and the other Byzantine commanders were unable to counter the Muslim cavalry or take advantage of the Byzantine army”s numerical superiority. The Byzantine cavalry never played a significant role in the battle being held in static reserve for many of the six days. They never pushed their attacks all the way and even when they had achieved what could have been a decisive breakthrough on the fourth day, they were unable to take full advantage of it. The Byzantine army”s difficulties seem to be due to the difficulty of commanding the army because of internal conflicts. In addition, many of the Roman auxiliaries were inexperienced, while the Arab Muslim army was largely composed of veteran troops.

Heraclius” original strategy, to destroy the Muslim troops in Syria, needed rapid execution, but the commanders never showed these qualities in the field. Ironically, at the Battle of Yarmuk, Khālid was able to execute on a small tactical scale what Heraclius had planned on a large strategic scale: by rapidly deploying and maneuvering his forces, Khālid was able to temporarily concentrate sufficient forces at specific points on the battlefield to defeat the larger Byzantine army there. Vahān was never able to make his numerical superiority count, perhaps because of the unfavorable terrain that prevented large-scale deployment. However, at no point did Vahān attempt to concentrate a superior effort at one point to achieve a critical breakthrough. Although he was on the offensive five days out of six, his battle line remained incredibly static. This is in stark contrast to the winning offensive plan that Khālid put in place on the last day of the battle, when he reorganized his entire cavalry by entrusting them with a grand maneuver that enabled him to win the battle.George F. Nafziger, in his book Islam at war, writes that:

Also read, battles – Battle of Gaugamela

Secondary sources

Sources