English Armada
gigatos | February 20, 2022
Summary
The English Invincible or Counter Armada or Drake-Norreys Expedition was an invasion fleet sent against the Spanish Monarchy by Queen Elizabeth I of England in the spring of 1589, as part of the operations of the Anglo-Spanish war of 1585-1604. The Anglo-Saxons refer to it as English Armada, Counter Armada or Drake-Norris Expedition. This last denomination is due to the fact that the expedition was commanded by Francis Drake, who was the admiral of the fleet, and by John Norreys as general of the landing troops.
The intention of this invasion force was to take advantage of the strategic advantage obtained over Spain after the failure of the Grande y Felicísima Armada sent by Philip II against England the previous year. The English objectives were threefold. The first and fundamental was to destroy the bulk of the remains of the Grande y Felicísima Armada, which were under repair in the ports of the Cantabrian coast, mainly in Santander.
The second objective was to take Lisbon and to enthrone the prior of Crato, Antonio de Crato, pretender to the Portuguese Crown and cousin of Philip II, who was traveling with the expedition. Crato had signed secret clauses with Isabella I by which, in exchange for English aid, he offered her five million gold ducats and an annual tribute of 300,000 ducats. He also offered to hand over to England the main Portuguese castles and to maintain the English garrison at the expense of Portugal. He also promised to give fifteen pay to the English infantry and to allow Lisbon to be sacked for twelve days, as long as the estates and lives of the Portuguese were respected and the sacking was limited to the population and estates of other Spaniards. In addition to all this, a free hand was given to English penetration in Brazil and the rest of the Portuguese colonial possessions. De facto, these clauses turned Portugal into a vassal of England and gave Elizabeth I the possibility of having her own overseas empire.
Finally, as a third objective, the Azores Islands would be taken and the Indies fleet would be captured. The latter would allow England to have a permanent base in the Atlantic from which to attack Spanish convoys from the Americas, which would be a significant advance towards the longer-term goal of wresting control of the trade routes to the New World from Spain.
The operation ended in a total defeat, unprecedented for the English, and constituted a resounding failure of dimensions comparable to those of the Spanish Armada. As a result of this disaster, the hitherto popular hero in England, Francis Drake, fell into disgrace.
The basic objective of Elizabeth I was to take advantage of the weakness of the Spanish Armada after the failure of the Great Armada of 1588 and to deal a definitive blow to Philip II, forcing him to accept the peace terms imposed by England. The first point of the plan was to destroy the remains of the Grande y Felicísima Armada, while they were undergoing repairs at their bases in La Coruña, San Sebastián and especially Santander. In addition, these attacks would be used to supply water and food by plundering these locations. Subsequently, they would disembark in Lisbon. In this way, and once the control over Portugal was assured, England would become the country”s main ally and commercial partner, and would take possession of some of the Azores in order to have a permanent base in the Atlantic from which to attack the Spanish commercial fleets.
Like its Spanish predecessor, the English Invincible suffered from an excess of optimism in an enterprise that was practically impossible given the technology available at the time. Possibly influenced by Drake”s successful attack on Cadiz in 1587, the English would make serious tactical and strategic errors, which would lead to disaster.
The whole plan was constructed as if it were a commercial operation. The expedition was financed by a joint stock company with a capital of 80,000 pounds. Of the capital, a quarter was paid by the queen, an eighth by the Dutch government and the rest by various nobles, merchants, shipowners and guilds. All of them expected not only a return on their investment, but also a large profit. This organizational criterion, based on a set of particular economic interests, had proved effective up to that time in promoting pirate and privateer expeditions, based mainly on surprise attacks. But on this occasion, given the enormity of the strategic objectives and the duration of the campaign against an alert enemy, it would prove calamitous.
The English had no experience at the time in organizing large naval campaigns, so logistics were very poor. Various concerns coupled with bad weather delayed the fleet”s departure. Other problems include that the Dutch did not provide all the warships they had promised, that the delay caused a third of the supplies to be consumed before leaving port (leaving them only two weeks of campaigning), that there were only 1800 veteran soldiers against 19,000 undisciplined, novice volunteers, that the siege weapons essential for taking fortresses were not carried, nor the cavalry essential for launching charges in land operations. It is probable that the logistical problem was underestimated because the previous year, when they fought against the Grande y Felicísima Armada of Philip II, they did so off their own coasts, being constantly supplied by small boats that came and went bringing them everything they needed.
Perhaps a controversial point was the decision to award command of the squadron to Francis Drake. Although Drake had achieved notable successes acting as a privateer and pirate, numerous colleagues had furiously criticized his attitude during the Spanish Invincible campaign the previous year, although Drake finally managed to take full credit for the Spanish defeat, a credit that is doubted by several historians. According to his earlier record, the English Invincible expedition required a leader with his supposed qualities. But later events would prove that Drake was not the right man to command a great naval expedition.
The English fleet sailed from Plymouth on April 13, 1589. On departure, the fleet consisted of six royal galleons, 60 English merchant ships, 60 Dutch magpies and about 20 pinnaces, in addition to dozens of barges and launches. In total, between 170 and 200 ships, thus more numerous than the Grande y Felicísima Armada, which had consisted of 121 to 137 ships. In addition to the land troops, 4,000 sailors and 1,500 officers embarked. The total number of combatants, between sailors and soldiers, was counted before sailing at 27 667 men. Emulating the tactics used the previous year against the Spanish, Drake divided his fleet into five squadrons, commanded respectively by himself (in the Revenge), Norreys (Nonpareil), Norreys” brother Edward (Foresight), Thomas Fenner (Dreadnought) and Roger Williams (Swiftsure). Together with them, and against the orders of the queen who had expressly forbidden their attendance to the campaign, sailed the favorite of Elizabeth I: Robert Devereux, II Earl of Essex.
From the very first moment, the indiscipline of the English crews was noticeable. Even before reaching the Spanish coast, some twenty small ships had already deserted, with a total of some 2,000 men on board. Added to this was the disobedience of Drake himself, who refused to attack Santander as he had been ordered, citing unfavorable winds and the fear of being surrounded by the Spanish fleet in the Bay of Biscay or running aground in the Bay of Biscay. Instead, Drake decided to set course for the Galician city of La Coruña. The reasons that led him to make this decision are not clear, but there may have been two fundamental reasons: firstly, Drake”s desire to repeat his success of 1587 when he attacked Cadiz, since there was a rumor that La Coruña held a fabulous treasure worth millions of ducats, which was false, and secondly, La Coruña was a departure base for numerous Spanish fleets, so it possessed large reserves of foodstuffs.
The defenses of La Coruña were quite deficient. The first sighting of the English sails took place in Estaca de Bares, in the area of Ortegal, from where warnings were sent to the city, where, after learning of the danger, a fire was ordered to be lit in the tower of Hercules to warn the whole region of the risk. There, after learning of the danger, a fire was ordered to be lit in the tower of Hercules to warn the whole region of the risk. The governor of the city, Juan Pacheco de Toledo, II Marquis of Cerralbo, gathering the few soldiers he had, in addition to the local militias and the noblemen, could only count on about 1500 men. In spite of everything, the civil population of the city was ready to help the defense in everything that was necessary, which would turn out to be decisive. As for the available fleet, there was only the galleon San Juan, the nao San Bartolomé, the urca Sansón and the galleoncete San Bernardo, as well as two galleys, the Princesa, commanded by Captain Pantoja, and the Diana under the command of Captain Palomino.
On May 4, the English fleet approached the port of the Galician city. The San Juan, the Princesa and the Diana stationed themselves next to the fort of San Antón and, supported by the fort”s batteries, shelled the English fleet as it entered the bay, thus forcing the attackers to stay away. Some 8000 English landed the next day on the beach of Santa María de Oza, on the opposite shore of the fort, bringing ashore several pieces of artillery and beating from there the Spanish ships that could not take cover or respond to the enemy fire. Finally, the Spanish sailors made the decision to set fire to the galleon San Juan and to shelter the galleys in the port of Betanzos, leaving most of the crews in the city to join the defense.
During the following days, the English troops under the command of John Norris attacked the city, taking without too much difficulty the lower part of the city, sacking the neighborhood of La Pescadería and killing about 500 Spaniards, among whom were numerous civilians. After this, Norris” men launched themselves for the upper part of the city, but this time they crashed against the walls of A Coruña. Stationed behind them, the garrison and the population of the town, including women and children, defended themselves with total determination against the English attack, killing about 1000 assailants. It was during this action that distinguished the one who today is still considered a popular heroine in the city of La Coruña: María Mayor Fernández de la Cámara y Pita, better known as María Pita. Legend has it that when her husband died in the fighting, when an English ensign was haranguing his troops at the foot of the walls, Doña María went at him with a pike and pierced him, also snatching his standard, which caused the definitive collapse of the morale of the attackers. Another woman who appears in the chronicles of the time for her distinction in the combats was Inés de Ben. María Pita was named by Felipe II Perpetual Ensign, and Captain Juan Varela was awarded for his performance in command of the troops and militias of A Coruña.
Finally, and with the news of the arrival of land reinforcements, the English troops abandoned the pretension of taking the city and withdrew to reembark on May 18, having left behind them some 1000 Spanish dead, and having lost some 1300 men, in addition to between two and three ships and four landing barges, all of them sunk by the cannons of the fort of San Antón and the Spanish ships. In addition, at that time epidemics began to take their toll on the English troops, which together with the harsh and unexpected rejection in the city contributed to the decline of morale and the increase of indiscipline among the English. After putting to sea, another ten small ships with about 1,000 men on board decided to desert and set course for England. The rest of the fleet, in spite of not having been able to provision in La Coruña, continued with the established plan and set course for Lisbon.
The pretender, the Prior of Crato, having been unable to establish a government in exile, had asked England for help in trying to seize the Portuguese crown. Isabella agreed to help him with the aim of diminishing Spain”s power in Europe, obtaining a permanent base in the Azores from which to attack Spanish merchantmen, and finally wresting control of the trade routes to the Indies from Spain. The Prior of Crato, the final heir of the House of Avís, was not a very good candidate: he lacked charisma, his cause was compromised by lack of legitimacy and he had an opponent better regarded by the Portuguese courts, Catherine, Duchess of Bragança. This fact called into question the English strategy for Portugal, as Antonio de Crato was supposed to attract followers and lead them in the battle against Spain.
With unflattering precedents, the English fleet finally anchored in the Portuguese city of Peniche on May 26, 1589 and immediately began the disembarkation of the expeditionary troops commanded by Norreys. Although there was no significant resistance, the English lost 80 men and some 14 barges due to the rough seas. Immediately the city”s fortress, under the command of a follower of Crato, surrendered to the invaders. Then, the army commanded by Norreys, composed at that stage of the mission by about 10,000 men, left for Lisbon, defended mostly by a guard theoretically little affected by Philip. At the same time, the fleet commanded by Drake also set course for the Portuguese capital. The plan was that Drake would force the mouth of the Tagus and attack Lisbon by sea, while Norreys, who would gather followers and supplies along the way, would attack the capital by land and finally take it.
But the truth is that the English army had to endure a very hard march to Lisbon, being decimated by the constant attacks of the Spanish-Portuguese parties, which caused hundreds of casualties, and by the epidemics that they already brought from the ships. In addition, the Spanish authorities had emptied all the villages between Peniche and Lisbon of materials and supplies that could be used by the English. On the other hand, the expected adhesion of the Portuguese population never took place. On the contrary, the Portuguese civilian population made a complete vacuum for the English troops, and all the way to Lisbon the English did not manage to add more than about 300 men. In reality, it seems that for the ordinary Portuguese, the supposed liberators were nothing more than heretics who had been plundering their coasts and attacking their fishing and merchant ships for years. On the other hand, the English had only 44 horses, so they had to transport most of the material using the soldiers. When the English arrived in Lisbon, after having traveled 75 hellish kilometers, their situation was dramatic because they lacked the means to force their way into the capital. They lacked gunpowder and ammunition, they did not have enough horses or cannons and they had run out of food.
Surprisingly for the English, the city not only showed no signs of intending to surrender, but was preparing to defend itself. The Lisbon garrison was composed of about 7000 men between Castilians and Portuguese. Although the Spanish authorities did not fully trust the Portuguese troops, there were never any uprisings or mutinies. On the other hand, some 40 sailing ships under the command of Matias de Alburquerque were anchored in the port, and the 18 galleys of the Portuguese squadron, under the command of Don Alonso de Bazan (brother of the illustrious Spanish sailor), were preparing for combat.
Immediately the Bazán galleys attacked the English land forces from the banks of the Tagus causing numerous casualties to the invaders with their artillery and with the musketry fire of the embarked troops. The English sought refuge in the convent of Santa Catalina, but were riddled by the artillery of the galley commanded by Captain Montfrui, and were forced to leave and continue the march under incessant fire. The following night, Norreys” soldiers set up camp in the dark to avoid detection by the fearsome galleys. Failing to locate the position of the invading troops, Don Alonso de Bazán ordered to simulate a landing by throwing several boats into the water, instructing his men to make as much noise as possible, to shoot into the air and shout, which immediately caused alert and confusion in the English camp, which prepared for defense. The Spanish galleys distinguished in the darkness the fires of the torches and the lit fuses of the English guns, so Bazán ordered to concentrate the fire of his ships on the lights, which caused a new slaughter among the English.
The following day, Norreys tried to assault the city through the Alcántara quarter, but again the galleys riddled the English troops, forcing them to disperse and retreat to take cover, after having caused a large number of deaths. After learning that some had returned to seek refuge in the convent of Santa Catalina, the galleys again opened fire on the building, forcing the entrenched troops to leave and killing many of them. Later, the English prisoners would tell of the terror that Bazán”s galleys caused them, responsible for an enormous number of casualties among their ranks. Finally Bazán disembarked 300 soldiers to attack the battered English army from land.
During the fighting, Drake”s passivity in not deciding to go into battle provoked a barrage of reproaches from Norreys and Crato who accused him of cowardice. Drake claimed that he had no chance of entering Lisbon because of the strong defenses and the poor state of his crew. The truth is that while the land troops bore the brunt of the battle, the English admiral stood by, either because he could not really do anything, or because he was waiting for the right moment to enter the battle when victory was certain and reap the laurels.
In any case, on June 11, another nine galleys of the Spanish squadron entered Lisbon, under the command of Martín de Padilla, carrying 1,000 reinforcement soldiers. This was the definitive turning point in the battle, and on June 16, the situation of the English army being already untenable, Norreys ordered the retreat. Immediately the Spanish-Portuguese troops were ordered to leave in pursuit of the English. Although there were no major battles, the Iberian troops took many prisoners who were straggling behind and appropriated a large amount of English equipment. Surprisingly, they also got hold of Antonio de Crato”s secret papers, which included a list with the names of numerous conspirators against the Spanish Empire.
After the heavy defeat suffered by Norris” army, Drake decided to leave Lisbon waters with his fleet and enter the Atlantic. For their part, the Spanish sailors set out in pursuit of the enemy.
Martin de Padilla, in command of the galley squadron of Castile, had great combat experience, as he had been commanding galley squadrons for more than 20 years in a relentless fight against pirates and Turkish, Algerian and English corsairs, since he was given command of the galley squadron of Sicily in 1567. Padilla knew very well that a galley could not face with possibilities of success any sailing ship of average tonnage, because the galleys were very little armed, they only had a large caliber cannon and several pieces of smaller size and range, and all of them located at the bow of the ship. To this was added the musketry fire of the embarked troops. While galleys were ideal for attacking land troops from shallow coastal waters, as had been demonstrated once again at Lisbon, they were clearly inferior to any sailing warship in a naval engagement. However, there was one tactical condition in which a galley fleet could do a lot of damage to a fleet of sailing ships: the absence of wind. This circumstance left sailing ships practically immobile, without the ability to maneuver and at the whim of sea currents. On the other hand, the galleys could use their rowing propulsion to maneuver and position themselves at the stern of the sailing ship, beating it with their scarce artillery so that the projectiles crossed the ship longitudinally, causing great havoc and without exposing themselves to the cannons located on the enemy”s side. In any case, this maneuver was extremely risky, since the sudden appearance of the wind could allow the sailing ship to turn sideways to the attacking galley and destroy it thanks to its overwhelming artillery superiority.
Thus, Padilla departed on June 20 after the English fleet in command of seven galleys: the captain commanded by Padilla himself, the second commanded by Don Juan de Portocarrero, the Peregrina, the Serena, the Leona, the Palma and the Florida. The Spaniards kept their distance from the enemy fleet, hoping for a stroke of fortune that would leave the English without wind and allow them to attack and destroy them. The Spanish commander was worried about Drake”s plans, and feared that his intention was to return to Cadiz to attack it as he had already done in 1587. During the night, Padilla went into the enemy fleet, and sent a Catholic English captain aboard a skiff to contact the English sailors and try to find out their plans. The only information they could obtain was that the English crews were sick and demoralized.
Light winds prevented the English from moving away from the Portuguese coasts, and finally the opportunity they had been waiting for arrived for the Castilians. With very light winds that prevented the sailing ships from maneuvering, the galleys were on the hunt. Padilla ordered his ships to form up in a line and attack the enemy ships that were out of formation. Thus, the line of galleys was positioned at the stern of the English ships, and successively beating them with their artillery, they relieved each other as the cannons were reloaded. For their part, the embarked troops beat the English decks with their muskets. Due to the impossibility of defending themselves or fleeing, the attacked English ships suffered a terrible punishment, being finally captured 4 ships of between 300 and 500 tons, a patache of 60 tons and a 20 oars boat. During those very hard attacks some 570 Englishmen died, and about 130 were taken prisoner. Among the latter were three captains, an engineer officer and several pilots. For their part, the Spaniards only regretted two dead and 10 wounded. But a light breeze began to blow again, so Drake, who had been a mere witness to the attack, was able to maneuver his flagship, and followed by four other larger vessels headed towards the Spanish galleys that were trying to tow their prey back to Lisbon. The Spaniards then decided to burn the larger vessels and sink the smaller ones with cannon fire, after which they withdrew, keeping their distance from the large enemy sailing ships, which were unable to reach them. At about 5 o”clock in the afternoon, a strong wind began to blow, so the English set sail and headed north. After this, Padilla, very worried about the danger that Cadiz was in, and in spite of having received three new reinforcement galleys, decided to abandon the fight and set course for the Andalusian city to participate in its defense if necessary. For his part, Don Alonso de Bazán decided to relieve Padilla with several galleys from the Portuguese squadron and continue the pursuit, capturing three more English ships during the following days.
Drake then set course for the Azores Islands, to try to achieve the last of the objectives agreed upon when the expedition was planned, but his forces were already very depleted, and were repulsed without great difficulty by the Iberian troops stationed in the archipelago. Having lost the advantage of the initial surprise, with the landing troops decimated by the fighting and the crew increasingly tired and affected by disease (there were only 2000 men left capable of fighting), it was decided that the objective of forming a permanent base in the Azores was not possible. After another storm that caused new shipwrecks and deaths among the English, Drake sacked the small island of Puerto Santo in Madeira, and already on the Galician coast, desperate for the lack of food and drinking water, he stopped in the Rias Bajas of Galicia to, on June 27, raze the defenseless town of Vigo, which at that time was a fishing village of about 600 inhabitants, despite which, the resistance of the civilian population caused new casualties to the attackers. Upon hearing news of the arrival of militia troops under the command of Don Luis Sarmiento, the English reembarked. After numerous desertions and a new outbreak of typhus, Drake decided to divide the expedition. Drake himself, in command of the 20 best ships, would return to the Azores to try to capture the Spanish Indian fleet, while the rest of the expedition would return to England. Essex was ordered by Elizabeth to return to court and Norris also decided to set course for England.
On June 30, Drake captured a fleet of Hanseatic merchant ships, which had broken the English blockade surrounding the islands through Scotland. But that did not serve to defray the expenses of the expedition because, in order to silence the protests of the Hansa cities, those ships had to be returned with their merchandise to their rightful owners. Before reaching the Azores again, another storm forced the English admiral to turn back, at which point he gave up and ordered to set course for England.
While the English fleet sailed dispersed due to the storms and the shortage of crews on the ships, Don Diego Aramburu received the news that the enemy was sailing in small groups through the Bay of Biscay on its way to England, so he immediately left the Cantabrian ports in command of a flotilla of zabras in search of prey, finally managing to capture two more English ships, which he towed to Santander. The English retreat degenerated into an individual race in which each ship fought on its own to reach a friendly port as soon as possible.
Indiscipline dominated the English fleet to the end. When Drake arrived at Plymouth on July 10 empty-handed, having lost more than half of his men and numerous ships, and having failed absolutely in all the objectives of the expedition, the soldiers mutinied because they did not accept the miserable five shillings offered to them as pay. And the protest took such a bad turn that to suppress it the English authorities hanged seven mutineers.
The Counter Armada expedition is considered one of the greatest military disasters in the history of Great Britain, perhaps only surpassed, a century and a half later and during the War of the Seat, by the defeat suffered in the siege of Cartagena de Indias again at the hands of Spanish troops. According to the British historian M. S. Hume, of the more than 18,000 men who made up that invasion fleet, minus the numerous deserters, only 5,000 returned alive to England. That is to say, more than 70 percent of the expedition died in the operation. Among the officers, the death toll was also very high: Rear Admiral William Fenner, eight colonels, dozens of captains and hundreds of noble volunteers died due to the fighting, shipwrecks and epidemics of that enterprise. To the human losses must be added the destruction or capture by the Spaniards of at least twelve ships, and many others sunk by storms. In addition to this, the English also lost at least 18 barges and several launches.
Apart from losing the opportunity to take advantage of the fact that the Spanish Armada was at a low ebb, the costs of the expedition exhausted Isabella”s royal treasure, patiently amassed during her long reign. Between the cannons captured in La Coruña, the supplies and other goods of various kinds seized in Galicia and Portugal, the total booty to be distributed among the numerous investors did not reach 29,000 pounds. Considering that the losses of the English crown due to the defeat had exceeded 160,000 pounds, the business could not have been more ruinous for Isabella.
Faced with the magnitude of the disaster, the English authorities appointed a commission to try to clarify the causes of the defeat, but the matter was soon buried due to political and propagandistic expediencies. For his part, Francis Drake, until then considered the scourge of the Spanish, was condemned to an almost total ostracism after the failure, being assigned the direction of the coastal defenses of Plymouth and denied the command of any naval expedition for the next 6 years. When he was finally given the opportunity to make amends for the failure of 1589 by being given command of a major naval expedition against Spanish America, he again led his men to disaster, finally losing his own life in 1595 in battles against Spanish forces stationed in the Caribbean Sea.
The Anglo-Spanish war was very costly for both countries, to the point that Philip II had to declare bankruptcy in 1596, after another attack on Cadiz. After the death of Elizabeth I and the accession to the throne of James I (King of Scotland and son of Mary Stuart) in 1603, he did everything possible to end the war. Peace came in 1604 at the request of the English. The clauses of the peace were stipulated in the Treaty of London, and were very favorable to Spanish interests. Both nations were already tired of fighting, but especially England, which at that time was only a middle power and was fighting at that time against the most powerful monarchy of the moment, and more so when it could no longer sustain the costs of a conflict that was very harmful to its economy. As a result of this peace agreement, England was able to consolidate its sovereignty in Ireland, in addition to being authorized to establish colonies in certain territories in North America that were of no interest to Spain. For their part, the English had to abandon their pretension to control the commercial routes between Europe and America and their promotion of corsair fleets against Spain, cease their support for the revolts in Flanders and allow the Spanish fleets sent to fight the Dutch rebels to use English ports, which meant a total rectification of English foreign policy.
After the defeat of the Counter Armada, Spain rebuilt its fleet, which quickly increased its maritime supremacy to a higher level than before the Great and Most Happy Armada. This supremacy lasted almost 50 years more, until the naval battle of Las Dunas (1639) in which Holland began to emerge as the first naval power. England would not definitively emerge as the first naval power until the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1700-1715, although during the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell the English navy repeatedly defeated the Dutch in the first Anglo-Dutch war.
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